online universities in usa > College Scholarships > Scholarship Application Strategies > Apply for Scholarships
Free AIOU Solved Assignment Code 4668 Spring 2023
Download Aiou solved assignment 2023 free autumn/spring, aiou updates solved assignments. Get free AIOU All Level Assignment from aiousolvedassignment.
Course: Political & Constitutional Development in Pakistan-II (4668)
Semester: Spring, 2023
ASSIGNMENT No. 1
Q.1 What was Mujeeb’s Six Point Formula? Elaborate all the six points and the rationale behind it.
Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman was the founder of Bangladesh. During the rule of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan, he played a bouncy role in Pakistan politics and became prominent especially when he presented a Six-Point formula in 1966, in collaboration with his party and demanded the Pakistan government to implement his six points in every way to the fullest extent. The Government of Pakistan disliked his idea that was prone to make the center significantly weak and the provinces predominantly independent. But his Awami League urged the Government to encompass all the six points in the new constitution that was to be framed by the new Constituent Assembly. Sheikh Mujib and his party showed extreme rigidity when asked to amend or modify a few points. Though at times he agreed to take a reasonable view of his points, especially before the elections of 1970, yet at every juncture, he backed out and stuck to the Six-Point formula that had made him exceedingly popular among the people of Bengal. All the members of the Awami League were so emotional that they pledged to make every sacrifice to implement the Six-Point formula. And it was the very formula that aroused them to civil disobedience and to defy the authority of the central government. A force of freedom fighters known as Mukti Bahini paralyzed the civil administration. Exploiting the appalling scenario India intruded, dashed off to their rescue, and paved the way for the Awami League to declare an independent Bangladesh.
The Six-Point formula comprised the following points:
1: Through a federal parliamentary system based on direct adult franchise representation of provinces would be based on population in the federal legislature.
2: The federal government will be restricted only to foreign affairs, defense and currency.
And even concerning foreign affairs, the subject of economic issues would rest with the provinces.
3: There would be either two different currencies for the two wings or a single one with a separate Federal Reserve System for each wing.
4: The power of implementing and collecting taxes would rest with the provinces. The federal government will be given enough shares to fulfill its tasks of foreign affairs and defense.
5: There would be separate accounts of foreign exchange earnings for each wing.
6: East Pakistan would be entitled to have militia or paramilitary force solely under its jurisdiction.
The mainstream political leaders of the opposition parties in Pakistan were not even willing to discuss the merits or demerits of the proposed six-point formula for ensuring greater provincial autonomy for the eastern province of Pakistan. In fact, no West Pakistani political leader (not even Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan, the President of the then All-Pakistan Awami League) was willing to lend any support to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s clarion call for maximum provincial autonomy based on the proposed six-point formula.
It is also really appalling to recall that, even after the lapse of forty two years, the non-Awami League delegates from the then East Pakistan did not endorse the six-point demand in that historic conference in early February 1966. Like their West-Pakistani counterparts, East Pakistani political stalwarts had also smelled an element of “secession” or “disintegration” of Pakistan in the six-point formula. In fact, the six-point formula could not be pried out of the “subject-matter committee” of that so-called all-party conference.
Instead of endorsing or discussing the six-point formula, the self-declared champions of restoration of democracy in the then Pakistan had deliberately launched a vile propaganda campaign against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the chief sponsor and proponent of the six-point plan. Doubtless, the motivated propaganda was essentially characterised by blatant falsehoods, conjectures, distortions, and innuendoes. In fact, the six-point proposal received frontal attack even from the veteran Pakistani political stalwarts of most of the political parties at a time when they were clamouring for establishing pure democracy in Pakistan!
In her celebrated book, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (The University Press, 1994, pp. 139-140), Dr. Rounaq Jahan succinctly summarised the hostile reactions of other political parties to the six-point formula: “The six-point demand not only split the Awami League but also made it difficult for the East Pakistan wing to form an alliance with any other West Pakistan-based party. The CML (Council Muslim League) decried the six points as a demand for confederation, not federation; the Jama’at-i-Islami branded it as a separatist design; the Nizam-i-Islam rejected it as a unilateral, dictatorial move on Mujib’s part; and the NAP (National Awami Party) dismissed it on the grounds that it was parochial and did not include any measures to free East Pakistan from imperialists agents.” Yet, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman refused to be blackmailed or intimidated by the criticism of his six-point plan.
In an impromptu press conference in Lahore on February 10, 1966, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman argued, as noted by Talukder Maniruzzaman in a seminal essay in 1967: “The question of (provincial) autonomy appears to be more important after the war (between India and Pakistan in September, 1965). The time has come for making East Pakistan self-sufficient in all respects. He then enunciated a ‘six-point charter of survival’ program for East Pakistan (Talukder Maniruzzaman, National Integration and Political Development in Pakistan, Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No.12, 1967, pp. 876-885).”
In that press conference, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had clearly said that since the proposed six-point demand was not at all designed to harm the common people of West Pakistan, the question of demanding a genuine “provincial autonomy” for East Pakistan based on the six-point formula “should not be misconstrued or dismissed as provincialism.” He pointed out that the 17-day war between Pakistan and India in September 1965 had made it crystal clear to the “East Pakistanis” that the defense of East Pakistan couldn’t be contingent upon the mercy or courtesy of West Pakistan. He said that instead of relying on West Pakistan for its protection, East Pakistan — a land located one thousand miles away — should be made self-sufficient for defending itself from external aggression. He also made it abundantly clear that his six-point plan for “maximum” provincial autonomy reflected the long-standing demands of the people of East Pakistan. He also pointed out the uselessness and irrelevance of the All-Party Conference.
On his return to Dhaka on February 11, 1966, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman provided further clarification on his six-point formula in a press conference. He explained why he had disassociated himself from the All-Party conference in Lahore. He clearly stated that the delegates from East Pakistan Awami League (EPAL) had rejected not only the proposals passed by the All-Party Conference but also severed all ties with the leaders of the so-called conference of the opposition parties. He said that it was not at all possible for him or his party to ‘betray the genuine interests” of the aggrieved and deprived people of East Pakistan.
He emphasised that the immediate adoption and implementation of his six-point formula “will be conducive to foster durable relationship between the two provinces of Pakistan.” In a press conference on February 14, 1966, he also repeated what he had uttered in his Lahore press conference: that the “the question of autonomy appears to be more important for East Pakistan after the 17-day war between Pakistan and India. The time is ripe for making East Pakistan self-sufficient in all respects.”
Reaction of the then dictatorial regime to the six-point plan
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s demand for “maximum autonomy” based on his six-point formula seems to have shaken the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The six-point plan had exposed the fact that the real intention of Pakistan’s ruling elite was to “strengthen” the central government, but not Pakistan. He repeatedly said in several public meetings that the people of Pakistan had always desired to have a “strong Pakistan,” not a “strong central government.”
However, the ruling coterie of Pakistan was not at all interested in dealing or negotiating with the Awami League on the issue of provincial autonomy even though Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had publicly stated that he was willing to negotiate his six-point plan with anyone in good faith, provided a meaningful autonomy was ensured for East Pakistan. The autocratic rulers of Pakistan started using repressive tactics to suppress the six-point movement. As noted by Dr. Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuyain, “the Ayub regime’s policy towards the six-point demand of the Awami League was one of total suppression. It showed once again that the regime failed to respond to the political demand (Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuyain, Emergence of Bangladesh & Role of Awami League, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1982, p. 104).”
Immediately after the provincial autonomy plan based on the six-point formula was unveiled by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the Lahore conference of opposition political parties in early February, 1966, Ayub Khan was quick to denounce it as a separatist or secessionist move. Aimed at browbeating the dedicated champions of greater provincial autonomy, Ayub Khan had started discrediting both the message and the messenger of the six-point program. Appearing in the final session of the Pakistan (Convention) Muslim League in Dacca on March 23, 1966, fully attired in the army general’s khaki uniform with full display of all of his regalia and medallions, the self-declared president of Pakistan had condemned the six-point plan in the harshest possible terms.
Characterising the six-point formula as a demand for “greater sovereign Bengal,” he claimed that such a plan would put the “Bengali Muslims” under the domination of “caste Hindus” of West Bengal. He had compared the “prevailing situation” in Pakistan (as of March, 1966) with the volatile situation that had prevailed in the USA before the outbreak of a prolonged Civil War in the early 1860s. He said that the nation might have to face a “civil war” if such volatile situations were forced upon him by the “secessionists” and “destructionists.”
He had even threatened the alleged “autonomists” and “secessionists” with “dire consequences” if they failed to shun the idea of provincial autonomy. Ayub Khan had also the audacity to threaten that the “language of weapons” would be ruthlessly employed for exterminating the “secessionist elements from Pakistan.”
AIOU Solved Assignment Code 4668 Spring 2023
Q.2 After the Elections of December 1970, why had the session of National Assembly not called and the majority party not allowed forming the government? Elaborate.
General elections were held in Pakistan on December 7, 1970 – 50 years ago today – to elect members of the National Assembly. They were the first general elections since the independence of Pakistan and ultimately the only ones held prior to the independence of Bangladesh. Voting took place in 300 constituencies, of which 162 were in East Pakistan and 138 in West Pakistan.
The elections were a fierce contest between two social democratic parties – the west-based Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the east-based Awami League of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Awami League was the only major party in the east wing, while in the west wing, the PPP faced competition from the conservative factions of the Muslim League – the largest of which was Muslim League (Qayyum), as well as Islamist parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP).
The result was a victory for the Awami League, which won an absolute majority of 160 seats, all of which were in East Pakistan. The PPP won only 81 seats, all in West Pakistan.
In the provincial elections held ten days later, the Awami League again dominated in East Pakistan, while the PPP won Punjab and Sindh. The Marxist National Awami Party emerged victorious in the Northwest Frontier Province and Balochistan.
The National Assembly was initially not inaugurated as the military dictator Yahya Khan and the PPP chairman Zulfikar Ali Bhutto did not want a party from East Pakistan heading the federal government. Instead, Yahya appointed the veteran Bengali politician Nurul Amin as prime minister, asking him to reach a compromise between the PPP and Awami League. However, this move failed as the delay in inauguration had already caused significant unrest in East Pakistan. The situation escalated into a civil war that led to the breakup of Pakistan and the formation of the independent state of Bangladesh. The assembly was eventually inaugurated in 1972 after Yahya resigned and handed power to Bhutto. Bhutto became prime minister in 1973 after the post was recreated by a new constitution.
The National Assembly elections and the enthusiasm they generated was a golden chapter in the history of the struggle for democracy in Pakistan. Until just a few years before, a military dictator used to say that democracy was not suited to the temperament of Pakistanis.
By voting the way they did, the people proclaimed that they had grown weary of the then-prevalent political and social system in the country and wanted to change it as soon as possible. They stood by every such slogan and party which stood for social revolution. Ranged against them were those who claimed Islam was in danger, or that the ideology of Pakistan was in danger. Fatwas of apostasy and heresy were issued upon socialism and its supporters and the election of the National Assembly was presented as a war between Islam and evil. Extremely provocative things were said about the left-wing parties in newspapers, mosque sermons but this storm of propaganda could not influence the people. They were not deceived by the Islamists because their daily experiences had made them aware that the demon of exploitation had worn the clothing of Islamism.
Everyone knew that the sole purpose of the 1970 election was to devise a democratic constitution. There was a strong possibility that indeed if a compromise developed between the Awami League and the Peoples Party then the constitution could very easily be framed in the appointed period of four months.
Approximately two dozen political and religious parties participated in the elections. Their manifestoes emphasised a solution to the political, economic and social problems of the country and made rosy promises to the people but the results of the election showed that only two parties – the Awami League and the PPP – were acquainted with the habits and disposition of the nation and were those who had the knowledge of the pulse of the feelings, emotions and desires of the people. The motto of both these parties was socialism. On the other hand, the parties which had started off as claimants of the Islamic system to contest the election were totally unsuccessful in identifying with the mood of the common people.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and most of his comrades had been busy in political activities since the very days of the Pakistan movement and their political party was old and experienced; but Bhutto and the Peoples Party were young. The systematic organisation of the Peoples Party was hardly two years at that time. In this short duration, the popularity which this party attained especially in Sindh and Punjab was astonishing. This party had participated in the elections in very unfavourable conditions. Most party workers were young and inexperienced, and the experienced ones were in jail.
Great responsibilities befell the Peoples Party and the Awami League after this success. They were no longer provincial parties and Mujib and Bhutto were not the leaders of a region but the whole nation. Now they had to prove with their word and action that they were eligible for this position and the trustees of peoples’ interest. The problems and interests of the people were the same everywhere whether they were in Sindh or in Bengal, Punjab, then-North West Frontier Province and Balochistan.
This victory was a big test for the Peoples Party. Its victory at least illuminated the reality that the dominant majority of then-West Pakistan was safe from provincial prejudice, religious frenzy, sectarianism and differences of caste. But the path to political power is very difficult and the PPP and Bhutto failed to do what was needed of them.
It is said that Ravana of Lanka had a thousand hands and when one of his hands got injured, he began to fight with the other hand. Similarly, the affluent classes too have a thousand hands. They do not admit defeat easily nor do they withdraw happily from their political and economic dominance. It is correct that the people clearly defeated them in the 1970 elections but wealth is not an intoxication which an election verdict can take off. The need of the hour was to beware this unlimited power of the enemy.
The stamp of this economic power of the wealthy could also be found on Pakistan’s national laws and institutions of law and order, especially the military, which were arrayed against popular demands whether it be the clash of democracy and dictatorship, the conflict of capital and labour, the struggle for citizens’ rights, the demand for wage increases or linguistic rights.
Sometimes section 144 was imposed to maintain peace, sometimes strikes were declared illegal under cover of basic industry, sometimes people were arrested without registering a case against them or presenting them in court for the security of Pakistan; though there was no such law according to which those who raised the prices of basic necessities received proper punishment. No such law was present according to which a case be registered upon non-provision of conveniences of medicine and treatment; or to investigate those who kept the nation ignorant; or according to which the hungry, homeless, unclothed and unemployed could move the chains of the court.
In short, Pakistan’s economic and social life was at that moment held captive inside a triangle. One angle of this triangle represented the interest of the ruling classes; the second, law; and the third was the the bureaucracy and the establishment. All these three angles were related to each other as well as being helpers and supporters of each other. No problem of the people could be solved without breaking the power of this triangle.
The big question confronting the victors of the 1970 elections in Pakistan was how to break the power of this triangle. The electorate wanted the Awami League and Peoples Party to act honestly upon the socialist principles of their manifestos while formulating a new constitution that would guarantee the rights of all.
Alas all of this came to naught as the elected assembly initially did not meet as the dictator Yahya Khan and Bhutto’s PPP did not want the majority party from East Pakistan to form government, as was its right. This caused great unrest in East Pakistan, which soon escalated into the call for independence on March 26, 1971 and ultimately led to a war of independence with East Pakistan becoming the independent state of Bangladesh.
The assembly session was eventually held when Khan resigned four days after Pakistan surrendered in Bangladesh and Bhutto took over. Bhutto became the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1973, after the post was recreated by the new Constitution.
The lesson from the 1970 election that eventually broke Pakistan a year later and its aftermath was that the popularity which is attained during some temporary excitement upon the shoulders of the people, is indeed temporary and comes and goes. These events proved and continue to prove in Naya Pakistan 50 years on that permanent and durable leadership is the one which remains steadfast on the righteous path of ideas and action for the completion of the true interests of the people and the remedy of their basic issues.
AIOU Solved Assignment 1 Code 4668 Spring 2023
Q.3 What were the impacts of nationalization of banks on the financial sector in Pakistan? Explain in detail.
- Introduction to Banking Nationalization of banks of Privatization of banks
- Nationalization of Bank Nationalization means transfer of any property or institution from the private to the ownership of state. It is defined as: “Nationalization is the process of bringing the assets of a company into the ownership of the state”
- Nationalization of banks in Pakistan • In the early years of Pakistan, the banks were going well and they played an important role in the economic development of country. • But afterwards it was felt that banks did not provide funds towards the most needy sectors of economy. • Keeping in view this situation the banking business was nationalized on 1st January 1947, under Bank Nationalization Act, 1974.
- Categories • On 31st December 1973 there were 13 Pakistani scheduled banks in Pakistan with 2906 branches in all over the country. • Govt. of Pakistan took control of all 13 commercial banks and state bank of Pakistan under Bank Nationalization Act, 1974. Govt. merged the weaker banks with the banks which had strong financial position to make 5 nationalized banks in all.
- Categories These banks are: I. National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) II. Habib Bank Limited (HBL) III. Muslim Commercial Bank (MCB) IV. United Bank Limited (UBL) V. Allied Bank Ltd. (ABL)
- Objectives Objectives of nationalization of banks were as follows: I. Credit for agriculture sector. II. Controlling unproductive expenditure III. Ending control IV. Professional management V. Credit for small entrepreneurs
- Advantages of nationalization of banks • Fair distribution of credit • Financing agriculture sector • Banking facilities for underdeveloped areas • Control over non-development expenditure • Security of deposits • Development of banks • Service motive • Price stability • Mobilization of resources • Use of profit
- Disadvantages of nationalization of banks • Low efficiency of bank employees • Poor service standard • Political interference • Favoritism • Rise in price • Unbalanced distribution of credit • Increase in expenses • Poor recovery of loan • Decrease in profit • Low competition
- Privatization of Banks
- Privatization of Banks Privatization is the process of involving private sector in the ownership state owned enterprises. It is defined as: “Privatization is the denationalization of an industry, transferring from public to private ownership”
- Privatization of Banks in Pakistan • The objectives which were expected by government have not been achieved. • Government of Pakistan decided to privatize the bank sector. • A privatization Commission was set up on 23 January 1994. The commission has transferred MCB, ABL, UBL, HBL but NBP was not privatized. It’s Shares have been sold to general public Through LSE.
- Rules for establishing a new bank in private sector • Public limited sector • Must be listed on SE of country • 20% shares must be offered to general public • Minimum capital of two billion • Directors of bank will not be allowed to sanction loans for themselves • Bank will concentrate their branch network in urban areas • Bank will provide quick & efficient services to customers
- • Bank will play an effective role in mobilization of savings. • Bank will provide services for rural areas according to new concessions and incentives. • Bank will have to abide by the instructions of SBP.
- Objectives • Better standard of service • Improvement in performance • Promote healthy competition • Quick decisions • Development of capital market • Increase in deposits • Security of loan
- Advantages of privatization of banks • Improvement in performance • Better standard of living • Decrease in expenses • Increase in deposits • Secured loans • Decrease in default loans • Productive loans • Quick decisions • Economic development • Reasonable profit
- Disadvantages of privatization of banks • Misuse of loans • Unhealthy competition • Neglecting small industries • Neglecting agriculture sector • Lack of co-operation • Concentration of wealth in few hands • Protection of black money • Advances to relatives and employees • Favoritism • Profit mitive
AIOU Solved Assignment 2 Code 4668 Spring 2023
Q.4 Z.A Bhutto was a proponent of democracy and always claimed to believe in real democracy but he was intolerant to dissent and opposition. Discuss this paradox of Z.A. Bhutto by focusing on his policies with regard to politicians in opposition.
It was the late 60s and this part of the world also witnessed the wave of socialism. It came with the downfall of Ayub and the rise of a new phenomenon in Pakistan’s politics: Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, an icon of resilience and symbol of democracy who faced dictatorship with utmost valour.
One of the students in those days who later on became a close aide of SZAB and a minister in his government was my father Abdullah Baloch whose memoirs about his leader are shared below as a tribute on SZAB’s 42nd death anniversary that falls today.
My father narrates that: “During the late 60s, one named echoed all around: people used to talk about and discuss Bhutto everywhere – from drawing rooms to tea cafes to public forums. As a youngster, I was fascinated by the charisma of Bhutto and during one hot summer day in 1967 I made up my mind and went to 70 Clifton where Mr Khar received me and took me to Bhutto Sahib who was having tea in his drawing room along with Hafeez Pirzada, Hayat Mohammad Sherpao and Meraj Mohammad Khan.
“I introduced myself and expressed my desire to work for his party; he asked me to visit the party office and start working. The first party office of the PPP in Karachi was at SMCHS; the office was rented in the name of Mohammad Khan Ghangro as it was Yahya’s martial law, and nobody was willing to give us space on rent for the party office.
“SZAB had impeccable style when it came to his clothes. Even his ministers were given a particular dress code – white for the day and black for the evening with different collar strips for the president, prime minister, senators, ministers, MNAs and MPAs, quite similar to the attire in China; this was later on replaced in Zia’s regime by the sherwani. SZAB was so charismatic that many of the party leaders including me used to follow his dress sense.
“He was a great admirer of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar and as an Auqaf minister he assigned me to install the golden gate gifted by the Shah of Iran; as a mark of respect, he always used to salute it on entering the dargah.
“The late 60s was the peak of socialism; the red book was a proud possession of every leftist in those days. During the Hala convention the leftist group of the party led by Meraj Khan were of the view that the party should not contest elections, but SZAB said “Don’t give me examples from the red book; you have read it, but I have done dialogue with them. We cannot serve the people unless we contest elections and come in power.”
“In 1970, he formed a parliamentary board for general elections and nominated me as its member. He emerged as a challenger for Ayub, such that the feudals of those times used to avoid any encounter with Bhutto to avoid Ayub’s wrath. And believe me those were the tough days – when Ayub’s government was struggling before the might of the rising leader, Bhutto. In 1972, when I was an MPA my house was burnt in the Karachi riots. SZAB called me to 70 Clifton, consoled me and tapped my shoulder to which I said this is a very small sacrifice for the party and the cause. This resulted in a smile on his face and he responded: “I expected the same from you”.
“SZAB was very encouraging. Seeing my passion, he appointed me in charge of the party secretariat. He used to encourage competition within his party to extract the best amongst all. The classic example of this was to keep extreme leftist Meraj and Hafeez, both poles apart, together in the Karachi chapter. He inculcated trust and confidence in the youth by inducting a young person like me in the cabinet as I was just 28 years old at that time; he also appointed me general secretary Karachi with Kamal Azfar as president, again poles apart.
“In 1976, during the super flood despite being an MPA from Karachi I was appointed minister for flood relief by SZAB. I tried my best and saved Sehwan and Dadu from being inundated by the floods with his guidance. Later he appreciated me for my efforts in his historic speech. He called labour conferences yearly where I used to participate as labour minister of Sindh and saw firsthand that he always wanted to have a grip on the pulse of the proletariat class.
“Once I went to see off SZAB at the Karachi Airport. He asked me: ‘where will you head from here?’ I replied home, as I was not feeling well. He immediately took out some tablets from his pocket and told me: ‘even though I am not well but still travelling; now you should also go back to work.’ He worked tirelessly and inspired all of us.
“Every passing year, April 4 reminds me what an enormous loss his death has been for the country. Shaheed Bhutto was a mentor and leader for me. I will always cherish the time spent with him, the lessons learnt from him and the pearls of wisdom he shared with me. His words still echo in my ears. Such leaders are born in centuries.”
AIOU Solved Assignment Code 4668 Autumn 2023
Q.5 What was Federal Security Force (FSF) and why had Z.A. Bhutto felt the need to establish FSF? Was it personal force of Bhutto? Elaborate the motives behind its establishment and its actual role.
In 1977 Ali Bhutto had every reason to feel supremely confident. He was prime minister with a strong majority in the national assembly he was prime minister of. He was perceived as the charismatic leader with a strong following among the peasants and the poor of the cities. Internationally he was a major leader of international organizations and could well have become the leader of the Third World. He had carried out substantial nationalization of the Pakistani economy. He now wanted to change the constitution of Pakistan to allow a presidential form of government. To do this he needed a two-thirds majority in the legislature.
In January he called for new elections for the national and the provincial governments. The election for the national assembly was to take place on March 7th and the elections for the provincial assemblies were to take place three days later on March 10th.
His popularity was such that the political opposition saw no chance of opposing him except in the form of a coalition party. The name for the coalition party was the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). This included parties extending from the religious right to secular parties of the political center. The member parties of the PNA agreed to field only one candidate in each district election.
Bhutto’s Pakistani Peoples Party (PPP) was expected to win the election. However in order for Bhutto to change the Constitution and create a presidential form of government he needed a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. So while there was little doubt that his party would win the election there had to be extra measures taken to achieve the two-thirds majority that he desired. Soon after legal steps were being taken to ensure an overwhelming victory in the election for the National Assembly.
The final day for filing as candidates for the March elections for the National Assembly was January 19, only 12 days after the election was announced. Under Pakistani law if only one candidate had filed for an office by the deadline date then that candidate would be declared elected unopposed. Bhutto had to be elected to the national assembly to be prime minister. In his district he was the only one who had filed for candidacy by the deadline. There were other candidates who wished to file that were detained by the police just before the deadline date. Therefore police power was being used to ensure an election outcome which would have been achieved by fair means anyway. This set the precident for later events. There were nine ministers from the PPP who were declared elected unopposed in the Sindh province as well. In fact, this was achieved because their opposition was kidnapped by the police just before the filing deadline date. Perhaps the PPP leadership sanctioned this ploy as a means to demoralize their opposition; to show them that opposition was futile.
In February Bhutto sent a note to the chief minister of the Punjab province telling him that he, Bhutto, was unhappy with the tempo of the election campaigning. Bhutto ordered him to get the campaign into high gear as soon as possible. At that time the election in Punjab was considered a tossup.
On March 7th 17 million Pakistanis of the 31 million eligible went to the polls and cast ballots. Bhutto’s PPP won less than 60 percent of the popular votes yet it captured about 75 percent of the seats in the national assembly. The opposition PNA won 35 percent of the popular votes and only gained 17 percent of the seats in the national assembly. There were immediate calls for dismissing the results of the national election. The political opponents of Bhutto’s VP P. called for a boycott of the provincial elections which were to be held on the tenth of March. As a result less than half of electorate returned to the polls to vote in the provincial elections. Leaders of the PNA called for strike on the Friday following the provincial elections. Most of his shops in the cities were closed for that strike. Bhutto had lost the support of the business class with his nationalization of small businesses in the past few years.
As noted above before the election the electoral chances for the PPP in Punjab were considered about an even 50-50. On March 7th when the election results were announced they showed Bhutto’s PPP having won 105 legislative seats out of the total of 115. The official results showed 70 percent of the votes in Punjab going to Bhutto’s PPP. Thus while the opposition PNA had won in the big cities of Karachi and Pehawar this was offset by the big win Punjab.
It was clear to everyone that a considerable amount of election fraud had occurred. Bhutto himself was actually depressed because it was so clear what had happened. In addition to seeking a two-thirds majority in the national assembly Bhutto also wanted to make a special effort to oppose the election of those candidates he felt would obstruct his future plans for Pakistan. Bhutto was also concerned about the need to maintain acceptance of his administration from the Army. There was concern about a growing prevalence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Army. This meant that the Army was becoming more sympathetic to his political opposition. Before the election Army officials reported finding posters in the Army Barracks at Multan calling for an Army revolution. Bhutto was confident that he had the allegiance of the Army because he felt secure in the leadership of Zia ul-Haq of the military. Bhutto had appointed Zia to his position. Zia in public and to Bhutto presented the appearance of subservience; in private he was distributing fundamentalist Islamic literature to the soldiers. So Zia’s deferential demeanor was a sham. He smiled and bowed and seemed humble but he had other plans in mind.
Bhutto recognized that he needed to negotiate with his political opposition. But he was not willing to consider any alteration of the results of the national election. He said the March 7th election was a settled matter. On that basis his political opposition refused to enter into any negotiations with him.
Pakistan at that time was suffering several economic crises. The cotton crop, a major economic base of Pakistan, had failed for the year. As a result of Bhutto’s past economic program of nationalization capital was leaving the country. Due to the shortage of tax revenue Bhutto’s government had been printing money which led to severe inflation. Bhutto had created a 20,000 member Federal Security Force to function as his personal guard. He needed funds to pay the salaries for this force and the military. To make matters worse he had promised a 50 percent raise in pay thoughout the military. Bhutto intended to deal with his cash problem by securing a $300 million loan from Citibank of New York. In order to obtain this loan he needed a guarantee by someone who was solvent. He thought the Shah of Iran would provide the guarantee. He wrote to the Shah on March 13 just one week after the national election to obtain that guarantee. The Shah replied that his government ministry had realized that borrower would be Bhutto himself rather than the government of Pakistan and that they needed three or four weeks to consider the matter of the guarantee under those circumstances. This meant in effect that Bhutto would not get his guarantee and therefore he would not get the Citibank loan.
Meanwhile the DMA opposition was calling for Bhutto’s resignation and new national elections to be held administered by the Army and the judiciary. A major protest march was held in Karachi and was dispersed by the police using tear gas. Bhutto government responded by having six of the top leaders of the PNA arrested for creating lawlessness. The next day the protest demonstrations could not be controlled by the police and the Army was called in to restore law and order. A curfew was imposed. Demonstrations against Bhutto were held in the major cities of Punjab.
The National Assembly met in Islamabad on March 28th. Only the PPP members showed up. In his address to the National Assembly Bhutto tried to placate the opposition by promising that there would be no further nationalizations. He offered to enter into a dialogue with the opposition thinking that it would settle for increased representation in the national assembly. He also charged that the opposition was being used by the great powers.
Bhutto had declared a national emergency and created a set of administrative measures called Defense of Pakistan Rules. Under these rules he had all of the opposition leaders arrested. He called for his political opponents to negotiate a solution and he would release them from prison and rescind the Defense of Pakistan Rules.
The opposition leaders did not trust Bhutto and the demonstrations continued. On April 9 there was a demonstrations in Lahore and the police opened fire with live ammunition instead of tear gas. The death toll was variously estimated from 8 to 37. In Karachi five more demonstrators were killed by the police. Elsewhere scores of prominent opposition leaders were arrested. Further strikes were called for and observed throughout the country. Local organizations began calling for an investigation of some of the actions of the Bhutto regime.
Bhutto on the other hand announced that he would not hesitate to do call out the Army to restore law and order. In response to this two former military leaders who were then ambassadors submitted their resignations.
Bhutto felt confident that with the allegiance of the Army under Zia he could control the situation. He however took steps to placate the Islamic fundamentalists. He announced that within six months his government would prohibit all alcohol, gambling, bars, and movie theaters. He would bring Pakistan’s laws in conformity with the Koran. Bhutto himself was known to have a drinking problem, to engage in dancing and was sanctioning the building gambling casinos within Pakistan.
On April 28 Bhutto made a national broadcast calling for public calm and the settlement of issues by negotiation. Later that day he met with the ambassador from Saudi Arabia and sought Saudi Arabian aid in resolving Pakistan’s difficulties. He charged that the U.S. CIA was guiding the opposition because he had refused to give up his goal of acquiring nuclear weapons technology.
Bhutto also had the notion that the Soviet Union was also behind that his problems. Bhutto believed the Soviet Union was financially supporting the opposition because if the opposition came to power they would dismember Pakistan. The Soviet Union would then gain influence and an Indian Ocean port in an independent Baluchistan. Bhutto had no problem in seeing the United States, the Soviet Union, and India as being behind his problems.
In May Bhutto announced that henceforth Friday would be the day of rest instead of Sunday. He intended this as a further placation of the Islamic fundamentalists. Bhutto also announced that there would be a national referendum on his continuance in office. He knew that very likely there would be an opposition boycott of this referendum and he would therefore get overwhelming support. He refused to accept the possibility of a new election for the national assembly.