Free AIOU Solved Assignment Code 4667 Spring 2024

Free AIOU Solved Assignment Code 4667 Spring 2024

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Course: Political & Constitutional Development in Pakistan-I (4667)
Semester: Spring, 2024
ASSIGNMENT No. 1

Q.1 Discuss problem of provincialism faced by Pakistan right after its emergence. What were the steps that were undertaken by the leadership to solve that problems?

  1. Choice of Capital and Establishment of Government 2. Unfair Boundary Distribution 3.Division of Military Assets 4.Division of financial assets: 5. Economic Problems 6.Issue of national language 7.Electricity Problem 8.Kashmir Dispute 9. Canal Water Dispute 10. Constitutional Problem
  2. • Pakistan came into existence on 14th august 1947. Soon after its establishment Pakistan faced number of problems. Most of the problems of Pakistan were related with Pakistan dispute with India, such as the accession of the princely states, canal Water dispute, refugees’ problems and distribution of armed and military assets. Infect most of these problems were deliberately created by India itself so that Pakistan would not maintain its independent status and soon merged with India. (Nehru told General Sir Frank Messervy in 1945, “his deliberate plan would be to allow Jinnah to have his Pakistan, end gradually makes things so impossible economically a nd otherwise for Pakistan that they have to come on their banded knees and asked to be allowed back to India
  3. • The first problem that Pakistan had to face was to choose a capital to form a Government and to establish a secretariat. • Karachi was chosen as the capital of Pakistan. • Quaid-e-Azam took the office of the Governor General, Liaquat Ali Khan was appointed as Prime Minister and a Cabinet of experienced persons was selected.
  4. —A boundary commission was set up under a British Chairman, Sir Cyril Redcliff. He misused his powers and handed over Muslims majority areas like Gurdaspur, Ferozpur and Junagadh to India hence providing them a gateway to Kashmir. Quaid-e-Azam called “it an unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse award.”
  5. • It was announced on July I, 1947 that Indian army would also be divided in ratio 65 to 35 in India’s favor it was with reference of the communal balance present in the British Indian Army. • Pakistan received was nothing but scrap and out of order machines, broken weapons, unserviceable artillery and aircraft. There were 16 ordnance factories and all were located in India. Pakistan was given 60 million rupees towards its share in the ordnance factories. • Pakistan did not receive the due share of the military assets till now. This dishonest attitude put Pakistan into great difficulties.
  6. — At the time of division there was cash balance of 4 billion rupees in the reserve Bank of India which was to be divided between India and Pakistan in the ratio of 17 to India and 5 to Pakistan. — Pakistan was to receive 750 million rupees, which was in initially delayed by the Indian Government. After the protest of Pakistan, India agreed to pay 200 million rupees. As the war between India and Pakistan had started on the issue of Kashmir India again stopped the rest of the amount. — However the remaining 50 million rupees are still not paid. The money was Pakistan’s rightful share. India deliberately withholds it because they hoped that Pakistan would become bankrupt.
  7. • When Pakistan came into existence, it mostly consisted of economically backward and underdeveloped areas. • The agricultural system was obsolete and outdated which added to the economic backwardness of the areas forming part of Pakistan. • The entire capital was in the hands of the Hindus. • Unfortunately, the banks and other financial institutions were located in Indian territory . • Besides these factors the technical experts and laborers, who operated the industries, were all Hindus because the Muslims extremely lagged behind in education and financial capabilities
  8. —After the establishment of Pakistan language controversy was started between East and West Pakistan. —The members of the Constituent Assembly belonged to East Pakistan demanded that instead of Urdu, Bengali should be made national language of Pakistan. —In March 1948 while addressing at Dhaka, Quaid-e-Azam declared, “Urdu and Urdu alone would be the national language of Pakistan.”
  9. • Due to transfer of Muslim majority areas to Bharat and unfair demarcation, electricity system of West Punjab was disrupted ,because all power stations were at Mundi, a predominantly Muslim majority area, gifted to Bharat but Quaid-e-Azam said: • “If we are to exist as a nation ,we will have to face the problems with determination and force.”
  10. • Kashmir dispute is the most important and unsolved problem. • Kashmir is the natural part of Pakistan because at the time of partition 85% of the Kashmir’s total population was Muslim. • The Hindu Dogra rule ,who was secretly with the Government of India declared Kashmir as a part of India. • Pakistan has continuously insisted that Kashmir must get their right of self determination but due to non- cooperation of India, Kashmir issue still remain unsolved.
  11. • The boundary of India and Pakistan in way that it cut across the rivers and canal making India the upper beneficiary and Pakistan the lower beneficiary. • Most of the rivers flowing in Pakistan have their origin in India. • In 1948, India stopped water supply to Pakistani canals to damage the Pakistani agriculture. • However on 9th September, 1960 on agreement called Indus Basin Treaty was signed between the two countries.
  12. • At the time of establishment of Pakistan the Government of India Act 1935 became the working constitution of Pakistan with certain adoptions. • The need of a constitution framed by the elected representatives of the people was necessary for free people. • So the first constituent assembly was formed and was given the task to frame the constitution for the country. • But the constituent assembly failed to frame a constitution even in eight years. • Lack of a permanent constitution created chances of corrupt interference in democratic progress of Pakistan.
  13. • Pakistan came into being as a free Muslim state in quite unfavorable circumstances ,it had no resources, it had to build up its administrative machinery from a scratch. But Supreme efforts were made by the Quaid-e-Azam and his colleagues to grapple with the situation. His golden principles “Unity ” “Faith” and “Discipline” gave way to Pakistan for a bright future of a strong and well developed country .In his last message to the nation on 14th August 1948,he told the nation: “The foundation of your state have been laid and it is now for you to build and build as quickly and as you can.” Quaid-e-Azam was addressing the historic public meeting at Lahore, he said: “ It is now up to you to work, work and work and we are bound to succeed. And never forget our motto Unity, Discipline and faith.”

AIOU Solved Assignment Code 4667 Spring 2024

Q.2 Make a detailed analysis of arguments put forth by the leadership of East Pakistan in favor of making Bengali as national language.

Twenty One Point Programme objectives incorporated in the election manifesto of the united front, an alliance of the opposition political parties, to contest elections of the East Bengal Legislative Assembly in 1954 against the then party in power, Muslim league. The United Front was composed of four political parties of East Bengal, namely Awami Muslim League, Krishak Sramik Party, Nezam-e-Islam and Ganatantri Dal. The Front was formed on 4 December 1953 by the initiative of AK Fazlul Huq of Krishak Sramik Party, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani and Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy of Awami Muslim League.

The 23-point package programme in the election manifesto adopted by the United Front runs as follows:

  1. To recognise Bangla as one of the State Languages of Pakistan;
  2. To abolish without compensation zamindari and all rent receiving interest in land, and to distribute the surplus lands amongst the cultivators; to reduce rent to a fair level and abolish the certificate system of realising rent;
  3. To nationalise the jute trade and bring it under the direct control of the government of East Bengal, secure fair price of jute to the growers and to investigate into the jute-bungling during the Muslim League regime to punish those found responsible for it;
  4. To introduce co-operative farming in agriculture and to develop cottage industries with full government subsidies;
  5. To start salt industry (both small and large scale) to make East Bengal self-sufficient in the supply of salt, and to investigate into the salt-bungling during the Muslim League regime to punish the offenders;
  6. To rehabilitate immediately all the poor refugees belonging to the artisan and technician class;
  7. To protect the country from flood and famine by means of digging canals and improving irrigation system;
  8. To make the country self-sufficient by modernising the method of cultivation and industrialisation, and to ensure the rights of the labourer as per ILO Convention;
  9. To introduce free and compulsory primary education throughout the country and to arrange for just pay and allowances to the teachers;
  10. To restructure the entire education system, introduce mother tongue as the medium of instruction, remove discrimination between government and private schools and to turn all the schools into government aided institutions;
  11. To repeal all reactionary laws including those of the Dhaka and Rajshahi Universities and to make them autonomous institutions; to make education cheaper and easily available to the people;
  12. To curtail the cost of administration and to rationalise the pay scale of high and low paid government servants. The ministers shall not receive more than 1000 taka as monthly salary;
  13. To take steps to eradicate corruption, nepotism and bribery, and with this end in view, to take stocks of the properties of all government officers and businessmen from 1940 onward and forfeit all properties the acquisition of which is not satisfactorily accounted for;
  14. To repeal all Safety and Preventive Detention Acts and release all prisoners detained without trial, and try in open court persons involved in anti-state activities; to safeguard the rights of the press and of holding meetings;
  15. To separate the judiciary from the executive;
  16. To locate the residence of the chief minister of the United Front at a less costly house, and to convert Burdwan House into a students hostel now, and later, into an institute for research on Bangla language and literature;
  17. To erect a monument in memory of the martyrs of the Language Movement on the spot where they were shot dead, and to pay compensation to the families of the martyrs;
  18. To declare 23 February as ‘Shaheed Day’ and a public y;
  19. The Lahore Resolution proposed full autonomy of East Bengal leaving defence, foreign affairs and currency under the central government. In the matter of defence, arrangements shall be made to set the headquarters of the army in West Pakistan and the naval headquarters in East Bengal and to establish ordnance factories in East Bengal, and to transform Ansar force into a full-fledged militia equipped with arms;
  20. The United Front Ministry shall on no account extend the tenure of the Legislature and shall resign six months before the general elections to facilitate free and fair elections under an Election Commission;
  21. All casual vacancies in the Legislature shall be filled up through by-elections within three months of the vacancies, and if the nominees of the Front are defeated in three successive by-elections, ministry shall resign from office.

AIOU Solved Assignment 1 Code 4667 Spring 2024

Q.3  Discuss in detail Basic Principles Committee, its composition and its performance.

The Basic Principles Committee was formed on 12th March 1949 by the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. The Basic Principles Committee was comprised of 25 members. These individuals were not required to be members of the first Constituent Assembly. It was headed by Maulvi Tameezuddin Khan and Liaquat Ali Khan was its Vice President. The task assigned to the Basic Principles Committee was to determine the basic principles for framing the future constitution of Pakistan.

There were three sub-committees set-up under the Basic Principles Committee:

  • Sub-committee on federal and provincial constitution and distribution of powers
  • Sub-committee on franchise
  • Sub-committee for judiciary

The task of these committees was to make a recommendation regarding the area of their expertise.

On 28th September 1950, the BPC presented its interim report to the Constituent Assembly. The salient features of this report were as following:

  • Objectives Resolution should be made part of the constitution and should serve as the directive principle of state policy.
  • The state of Pakistan was to be a federation.
  • The Central Legislature was to be bicameral. It would consist of a House of Unit (Upper House) with 100 members and a House of People (Lower House) with 400 members.
  • The Upper House was to be the representative institution of the provinces, elected by the provincial legislature. While the Lower House was to be elected by the people based on adult franchise.
  • The tenure of both the Houses was to be five years and both were to enjoy equal power.
  • The decisions regarding budget or monetary bills were to be decided in joint sessions of the two houses.
  • The Head of state was to be elected by a joint session of the two houses for a term of five years and would work on the advice of the Prime Minister.
  • The federal legislature had the authority to remove the head of state.
  • Each province was to have its legislature; elected based on adult franchise for a term of five years.
  • The Head of the provincial legislature was to be elected by the head of state for a term of five years and he was to work on the advice of the Chief Minister.
  • Legislative power was to be divided into three lists: 1) The Federal list comprising of 67 subjects on which the central legislature would legislate. 2) The Provincial list comprising of 35 items, the provincial legislature would legislate on these subjects. And 3) The Concurrent list of 37 items on which both the central and provincial legislatures had the authority to legislate. The residuary powers were vested in the center.
  • In case of a dispute, the Supreme Court had the authority to interpret the constitution.
  • The procedure to amend the constitution was very rigid; it required majority approval from the central and provincial legislatures.
  • The Head of the state was given added powers like the authority to abrogate the constitution and issue ordinances.
  • Urdu was to be the state language.
  • The Supreme Court was the head of the judiciary. It would consist of the Chief Justice and 2 to 6 judges. And High Courts for each province were to be established.
  • A Board of Ulama would be appointed by the head of state and provincial governors to examine the process of law-making and to ensure that laws were in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah.

The reaction to this report proved counterproductive and was not conducive to success. As a consequence popularity of the First Constituent Assembly was badly maligned. Resultantly Liaquat Ali Khan was forced to postpone his considerations on account of severe criticism on the part of East Pakistan. This delay led to many complications in the progress of the First Constituent Assembly.

This report was criticized strongly by S.C. Chattopadyaya and East Pakistan. The crux of criticism was related to underrepresentation in the central legislature and the proposal for a strong center with vast powers on financial matters. East Pakistan was given an equal number of seats in the Upper House, the same as West Pakistan. Thus it reduces the principle of majority and turned East Pakistan into a minority. Moreover, the interim report was preposterous for East Pakistan since it Urdu as the national language and Bengali was nowhere in the constitutional arena.

As a result of this reaction, Liaquat Ali Khan postponed the consideration of the report and invited new suggestions. To include public opinion he called forth general comments and suggestions by the public on the report. For this, a committee was set up headed by Sardar Abdur Rab Nishter, who presented a report in the Constituent Assembly in July 1952.

Resultantly, the struggle for making a constitution caused serious apprehension in the mind of East Pakistan. They felt that the Bengali interests were not safe in such a state of affairs. There could have been rational and mature negotiations with productive and pleasing results for the sake of nationalism, but that did not happen. Even though the constitutional deadlock was later vented off but it was too late, the interim report inevitably posed an ever-impending threat in the minds of East Pakistan that their interests were not safe given the supremacy accorded to West Pakistan in a federation.

But the second and final report of the Basic Principles Committee was not received too well. The report was criticized because of these defects:

  • The draft ignored the fact that East Bengal contained the majority of the population of the country and West Pakistan had a major part of the country’s territory.
  • The draft made the lower house a weak replica of the House of People and reduced its utility. It also made no provision if both houses were unable to resolve the conflict in a joint session.

Like the first report, this was also criticized but this time criticism arose from Punjab which considered the federal formula to be defective. They demanded equal representation for various units in the lower house and equal power for both Houses. The Punjab members in the Basic Principles Committee and the Federal Cabinet disliked the formula because they felt East Pakistan would easily dominate West Pakistan which had been divided into nine units.

Religious leaders were also not satisfied with the Islamic character of the recommended constitution especially with regards to their demand for the declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims. In July 1952 during the All Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention held at Lahore a demand was put forward for the removal of Ahmadis from the key posts including Zafarullah Khan who was the Foreign Minister.  Although Nazaimuddin sympathized with the demand he refused to incorporate them in the Basic Principles Committee report.

AIOU Solved Assignment 2 Code 4667 Spring 2024

Q.4  Why had Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din been proved as a weak prime minster? Discuss the circumstances that caused his failure as an effective prime minister.

Khwaja Nazimuddin, a rich landlord and a nephew of Nawab Salimullah, was a member of the Nawab family of Dhaka. His world was the narrow confines of the feudal aristocracy. He was bred if not born to lead Muslim Bengal but because of his background, he was an anachronism in Bengal politics and its aspiration. His mother tongue was Urdu and Bangla was least known to him. He was the son of Khwaja Nizamuddin and Nawabzadi Bilkees Bano and was married to Shah Bano, daughter of Khwaja Ashraf in 1925. He was the most outstanding and successful member of the Dhaka Nawab family. He died on 23 October 1964 and lies buried beside the graves of Fazlul Haq and Suhrawardi on the ground of Dhaka High Court. Their mausoleum is known as the Mazar of three national leaders.

Nazimuddin had the introduction of a great family. He had wealth that freed him from abrasion against the tough world. He had the education from celebrated universities and a cultivated mind, a blend of eastern and western thoughts and ideas. His personality was an integrated whole composed of seemingly divergent traits.  He was born an aristocrat, but he remained singularly free from the foils and foibles associated with the landed aristocracy. He was a man of faith and fidelity, veracity and sincerity, urbanity and simplicity. In fact, to him, the word was an honour. He had a great love for Islam and its traditions. There was not a trace of pride or superciliousness in him.

Khwaja Nazimuddin entered politics with determination, properly educated and equipped for it. The politics that he professed and practised were clean and fair. He knew how to win and how to lose with grace. In political life, he was distinguished by two qualities, consistency and loyalty. His political faith and stand were throughout consistent. He constantly kept these twin objectives before him. Though he was a nice man, he was not outstandingly resolute or strong. He was straight in politics but ineffective. He was always known to be a weak and nervous man, and his brother Khwaja Shahabuddin was reputed to be the brain behind him. His nobility combined with the softness of his temperament handicapped his politics. Though, his apparent solemnity concealed his self-doubt and inadequacies.

Khwaja Nazimuddin was one of the most popular figures in the political history of Pakistan in its formative phase. He belonged to the rare breed of politicians, against whom a single charge of corruption or misuse of power was ever levelled, despite his extended stay in public offices. His unquestioning loyalty and commitment, sincerity and nobility of heart were the celebrated features of his personality and politics. Although he was indecisive, less efficient, less forceful, and less-ambitious administrator, but these seeming handicaps proved to be the merit of his selections in high political offices.

Khwaja Nazimuddin had sound common sense, and was widely respected for his property, old-world courtesy and helpfulness and was, above all, unwavering in his loyalty to the Quaid-i-Azam and devotion to the cause of Pakistan. Throughout his political life, he remained unflinchingly loyal to his political organisation, his leader and his colleagues. He remained a member of the Muslim League from the first till the last days of his political career, and it is a known fact that he was among the most loyal and devoted associates and stalwarts of the Quaid-i-Azam and Pakistan Movement. Quaid-i-Azam always trusted Nazimuddin and had him closely associated with the Simla Conference as well as the discussions with the Cripps and the Cabinet Mission. He showed throughout his political career that unflinching loyalty could expect handsome rewards from their grateful masters.

Nazimuddin belonged to an elite family and his life was full of honours and triumphs, but more than that all his career was notable for the nobility of his heart and conduct. The numerous victories, he scored and the highest offices as well as titles of the great honour which were bestowed on him right from 1923 to 1953 bear testimony to that fact. Nazimuddin started his career as Chairman of the Dhaka Municipality in 1923, a position he held till 1929. During that time, he was also a Member of the Executive Council of Dhaka University. For his good work at both these institutions, in 1929 he was appointed a Member of the Governor’s Executive Council.  He continued to serve in this capacity till 1937. He was elected a Member of Bengal Legislative Assembly from Barisal Muslim constituency in 1925, 1926 and 1929 and was the Education Minister of United Bengal from 1929 to June 1934 and later as Minister for Agriculture. In the former capacity, he successfully piloted the Compulsory Primary Education Bill; removing the disparity that existed in education between the Hindus and the Muslims. As Minister for Agriculture in 1935, he piloted the Agriculture Debtors Bill and the Bengal Rural Development Bill which freed poor Muslim cultivators from the clutches of Hindu moneylenders.

Nazimuddin was associated with the Muslim League from the mid-thirties and remained associated with it till his last breath. The Muslim League was re-organized in Bengal in 1935 by virtue of the inspiration given by the Quaid-i-Azam and the active leadership of Khwaja Nazimuddin. He was among the pioneers from Bengal who responded to the Quaid-i-Azam’s call to reorganize the Muslim League in Bengal in preparation for the forthcoming general elections of 1937. Since then he was one of the most loyal lieutenants of the Quaid-i-Azam and one of the most ardent supporters of the Muslim League. He was an emphatic and consistent Muslim Leaguer. His able leadership had brought all the different Muslim parties under one platform except for Fazlul Haq and his Krishak Praja Party. His refusal to join the Muslim League meant a certain division of the Muslim votes which would have been fatal for them. To avoid this catastrophe at the time of the election in Bengal, the two parties United Muslim Party and New Majlis Party merged in Muslim League to form an election alliance. Thus, the Muslim League emerged as the single largest party in the election.

In the Election of 1937, Nazimuddin as ML candidate was defeated by Fazlul Haq, the KPP leader, in the Patuakhali constituency. But later, he won from the North Calcutta constituency vacated by Suhrawardy. But his early defeat so deeply affected him that later he always avoided contesting elections. He failed to emerge as a mass and popular leader; instead, he concentrated his energies to oblige his political masters.

In 1937 he was appointed Home Minister in Haq’s Coalition Ministry. On 1st December 1941, he resigned from the Cabinet because of differences between Haq and Jinnah. Fazlul Haq was expelled from the League and his Ministry way to another Ministry in coalition with the Congress members. During the Shyama-Haq Coalition (1942 to 1943), Nazimuddin acted as the Leader of the Opposition. On 25th April 1943, Muslim League formed the Ministry with Nazimuddin as the Prime Minister on the fall of Haq Ministry on 28th March 1943. The circumstances were unpropitious. The threat of famine was imminent in Bengal. Nazimuddin and his Ministry boldly faced the situation and resolutely set themselves to the task of overcoming the famine. Due to the machinations of the opposition and the shifting loyalty of some elements, Nazimuddin’s Cabinet was dissolved on 28th March 1945 and he lost Chief Ministership to Suhrawardy. However, he remained a member of the All India Muslim League Working Committee from 1937 to 1947.

In 1946, Nazimuddin was elected a member of the Central Legislative Assembly in New Delhi and was appointed Deputy Leader of Opposition. That reflected the trust and confidence bestowed on him by the Quaid-i-Azam at that very critical juncture. Throughout this period of struggle, Nazimuddin remained one of Quaid’s trusted colleagues. The nation and the leaders of the Muslim League did not forget his sincerity to the cause of the Muslims of India and the Muslim League.

Within the formation of Pakistan, he became an important part of the early governments. He was appointed Chief Minister of East Bengal after the creation of Pakistan on 14th August 1947. In the leadership contest, Nazimuddin was supported against Suhrawardy by the Central League leadership, because of Suhrawardy’s involvement with the united Bengal movement, and his association with Gandhi.

In two different and difficult situations for the country, Nazimuddin was called upon unanimously to serve the nation. First, on the occasion of the passing away of the Quaid-i-Azam in 1948, he was considered by all to be the most suitable person to occupy the office of the Governor-General of Pakistan. He accepted the office as a challenge and became the second Governor-General of the country. At this point, the position was largely ceremonial, and executive power rested with the Prime Minister, but he performed his role as constitutional Governor-General with dignity and propriety. Secondly, when after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, the cabinet members of L. A. Khan unanimously invited Nazimuddin to take over as Prime Minister. Later, he was also elected a member of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly as well as the President of the Muslim League. He commanded the respect and enjoyed the confidence as Prime Minister, yet on 17th April 1953 was dismissed in clear violation of the constitution by Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad with the help of the civil-military bureaucracy and also invited Mohammad Ali Bogra to form the new ministry.

Many factors had contributed to Nazimuddin’s ousting from the Prime Ministership. The poor state of the economy, issues of constitutional, political and foreign policies, the Punjabi-Bengali rivalry, the anti-Ahmadi movement were some of the more important reasons. However, the unconstitutional and undemocratic dismissal of Nazimuddin as Prime Minister of Pakistan was a serious blow to the development of democracy in Pakistan.

In June 1953, Nazimuddin resigned from the post of the President of the Muslim League and kept himself aloof from active politics, and stayed in the peaceful vicinity of his daughter’s home. In 1958 he was awarded the title of Nishan-i-Pakistan. He refrained from politics and led a life of retirement until 1962. But, in 1963 he returned to politics and became the President of the Pakistan Council Muslim League. He devoted his energies to the revitalization of the Muslim League. He struggled hard for the restoration of democracy and protection of fundamental rights and rejected the dictatorial attitudes of Ayub’s regime. He was a great patriot and strongly resisted the secessionist tendencies in East Pakistan at the cost of his popularity. He played a leading part in obtaining Miss Fatima Jinnah’s consent in becoming the presidential candidate of the opposition political parties.

With all this background, he remained a humble and pious person throughout his life and was never arrogant. He experienced many ups and downs in his political career, but he never lost his bearings and always conducted himself with patience. He was loyal and faithful to his political patrons. He was a gentleman par excellence. His loyalty was by nature whether it was to the British or the Muslim League. British liked him for his feudal connection and loyalty and elevated him to the prestigious slots. Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali liked his sincerity and devotion to the Muslim League and with their blessings, Nazimuddin reached the echelon of power in Pakistan. To Ghulam Muhammad, he was, however, an “inefficient” and a “comical figure” of a man and as Governor-General, he brutally knocked him out from the Prime Ministership.

Nazimuddin, however, because of his performance and absence of charisma proved an unworthy successor of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. When he was the Governor-General, the power resided with Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. When he became the Prime Minister, the power was in the hands of Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad. It seems power always dodged him and was never within his grip.

History will remember him as a gentleman and a man of virtue though not great. His loyalty to his political masters and his birth in the Nawab’s Family of Dhaka were the elements of his success. His paralysis of will to act even at times of emergency and his unimpressive personality were the reasons for his failure. He lacked the charisma of a leader and could not fascinate the populace. No doubt, he had his shortcomings, but they were the defects of his qualities. He was well aware of his flaws but was not willing to play dirty tricks simply for the sake of power.

He was not morally corrupt and power-hungry, he never aspired or conspired for power, it always bestowed upon him as a reward of his loyalty and sincerity, while, his political rivals used every fear and foul means to grasp power. Although he lacked the qualities of a shrewd politician, a resonant and visionary leader, inhuman qualities of piety, honesty and dignity, he was outstanding.

Nazimuddin was a victim of realpolitik. A powerful and ambitious troika of Ghulam Muhammad, Sikandar Mirza and Ayub Khan backed by the civil and military bureaucracy and the assistance of short-sighted and self-centric politicians conspired against him and ousted him from power. His undemocratic and unconstitutional ouster from power proved to be the most catastrophic for democracy in Pakistan. His dismissal was the benchmark of political degradation, instability and chaos, which ultimately lead to the imposition of the first Martial Law by Ayub Khan. The rise of the undemocratic forces which were least concerned with popular aspirations paved the way to the disintegration of Pakistan.     

AIOU Solved Assignment Code 4667 Autmn 2024

Q.5 Critically analyze the reasons for the failure of Muslim League as an effective political party after the establishment of Pakistan.                                                                               

Long before the British invaded and seized control of the subcontinent, Muslim armies had conquered the settled populations in the rolling flat land that stretched from the foothills of the Hindu Kush to the city of Delhi and the Indo-Gangetic Plain and eastward to Bengal. The last and most successful of the Muslim conquerors was the Mughal dynasty (1526–1857), which eventually spread its authority over virtually the entire subcontinent. British superiority coincided with Mughal decline, and, following a period of European successes and Mughal failures on the battlefield, the British brought an end to Mughal power. The last Mughal emperor was exiled following the failed Indian Mutiny of 1857–58.

Less than three decades after that revolt, the Indian National Congress was formed to give political representation to British India’s indigenous people. Although membership in the Congress was open to all, Hindu participants overwhelmed the Muslim members. The All India Muslim League, organized in 1906, aimed to give Muslims a voice so as to counter what was then perceived as the growing influence of the Hindus under British rule. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, earlier a prominent Muslim member of the Congress, assumed leadership of the league following his break with Congress leader Mohandas K. Gandhi. A firm believer in the Anglo-Saxon rule of law and a close associate of Iqbal, Jinnah questioned the security of the Muslim minority in an India dominated by essentially Hindu authority. Declaring Islam was endangered by a revived Hindu assertiveness, Jinnah and the league posited a “two-nation theory” that argued Indian Muslims were entitled to—and therefore required—a separate, self-governing state in a reconstituted subcontinent.

The British intention to grant self-government to India along the lines of British parliamentary democracy is evident in the Government of India Act of 1935. Up to that time, the question of Hindus and Muslims sharing in the governance of India was generally acceptable, although it was also acknowledged that Hindus more so than Muslims had accommodated themselves to British customs and the colonial manner of administration. Moreover, following the failed Indian Mutiny, Hindus were more eager to adopt British behaviours and ideas, whereas Indian Muslims bore the brunt of British wrath. The Mughal Empire was formally dissolved in 1858, and its last ruler was banished from the subcontinent. Believing they had been singled out for punishment, India’s Muslim population was reluctant to adopt British ways or take advantage of English educational opportunities. As a consequence of these different positions, Hindus advanced under British rule at the expense of their Muslim counterparts, and when Britain opened the civil service to the native population, the Hindus virtually monopolized the postings. Although influential Muslims such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan recognized the growing power imbalance and encouraged Muslims to seek European education and entry into the colonial civil service, they also realized that catching up to the more progressive and advantaged Hindus was an impossible task.

It was this juxtaposition of an emerging feeling of Hindu superiority and a sustained sense among Muslims of inferiority that the All India Muslim League addressed in its claim to represent the Muslims of India. Unlike other Muslim movements of the period, the Muslim League articulated the sentiments of the attentive and at the same time more moderate elements among India’s Muslim population. The Muslim League, with Jinnah as its spokesman, was also the preferred organization from the standpoint of British authority. Unlike Gandhi’s practices of civil disobedience, the lawyer Jinnah (who was called to the bar at Lincoln’s Inn, London) was more inclined to promote the rule of law in seeking separation from imperial rule. Jinnah, therefore, was more open to a negotiated settlement, and, indeed, his first instinct was to preserve the unity of India, albeit with adequate safeguards for the Muslim community. For Jinnah, the Lahore (later Pakistan) Resolution of 1940, which called for an independent Muslim state or states in India, did not at first imply the breakup of the Indian union.

World War II (1939–45) proved to be the catalyst for an unanticipated change in political power. Under pressure from a variety of popular national movements—notably those organized by the Congress and led by Gandhi—the war-weakened British were forced to consider abandoning India. In response to the Congress campaign that Britain quit India, London sent a mission headed by Sir Richard Stafford Cripps (the Cripps Mission) to New Delhi in early 1942 with the promise that Congress’s cooperation in the war effort would be rewarded with greater self-rule and possibly even independence when the war ended. Gandhi and the other Congress leaders, however, could not be appeased, and their insistence that Britain allow for a transfer of power while the war raged produced an impasse and the failure of the mission.

During that period, the Jinnah-led Muslim League was substantially less aggressive in seeking immediate British withdrawal. The differences between the two groups were not lost on Britain, and the eventual defeat of Germany and Japan set the scene for the drama that resulted in the partition of British India and the independence of Pakistan. The new postwar Labour Party government of Clement Attlee, succeeding the Conservative Winston Churchill government, was determined to terminate its authority in India. A cabinet mission led by William Pethick-Lawrence was sent in 1946 to discuss and possibly arrange the mechanisms for the transfer of power to indigenous hands. Throughout the deliberations the British had to contend with two prominent players: Gandhi and the Congress and Jinnah and the Muslim League. Jinnah laboured to find a suitable formula that addressed the mutual and different needs of the subcontinent’s two major communities. When Pethick-Lawrence’s mission proved unequal to the task of reconciling the parties, the last chance for a compromise solution was lost. Each of the major actors blamed the other for the breakdown in negotiations, with Jinnah insisting on the realization of the “two-nation theory.” The goal now was nothing less than the creation of a sovereign, independent Pakistan.

Like India, Pakistan achieved independence as a dominion within the Commonwealth in August 1947. However, the leaders of the Muslim League rejected Lord Mountbatten, the last British viceroy of India, to be Pakistan’s first governor-general, or head of state—in contrast to the Congress, which made him India’s chief executive. Wary of Britain’s machinations and desirous of rewarding Jinnah—their “Great Leader” (Quaid-e Azam), a title he was given before independence—Pakistanis made him their governor-general; his lieutenant in the party, Liaquat Ali Khan, was named prime minister. Pakistan’s first government, however, had a difficult task before it. Unlike Muhammad Iqbal’s earlier vision for Pakistan, the country had been formed from the two regions where Muslims were the majority—the northwestern portion he had espoused and the territories and the eastern region of Bengal province (which itself had also been divided between India and Pakistan). Pakistan’s two wings, therefore, were separated by some 1,000 miles (1,600 km) of sovereign Indian territory with no simple routes of communication between them. Further complicating the work of the new Pakistani government was the realization that the wealth and resources of British India had been granted to India. Pakistan had little but raw enthusiasm to sustain it, especially during those months immediately following partition. In fact, Pakistan’s survival seemed to hang in the balance. Of all the well-organized provinces of British India, only the comparatively less developed areas of SindBalochistan, and the North-West Frontier Province came to Pakistan intact. The otherwise more developed provinces of Punjab and Bengal were divided, and, in the case of Bengal, Pakistan received little more than the densely populated rural hinterland.

Adding to the dilemma of the new and untested Pakistan government was the crisis in Kashmir, which provoked a war between the two neighbouring states in the period immediately following their independence. Both Pakistan and India intended to make Kashmir a component of their respective unions, and the former princely state quickly became disputed territory—with India and Pakistan controlling portions of it—and a flash point for future conflicts. Economically, the situation in Pakistan was desperate; materials from the Indian factories were cut off from Pakistan, disrupting the new country’s meagre industry, commerce, and agriculture. Moreover, the character of the partition and its aftermath had caused the flight of millions of refugees on both sides of the divide, accompanied by terrible massacres. The exodus of such a vast number of desperate people in each direction required an urgent response, which neither country was prepared to manage, least of all Pakistan.

As a consequence of the unresolved war in Kashmir and the communal bloodletting in the streets of both countries, India and Pakistan each came to see the other as its mortal enemy. The Pakistanis had anticipated a division of India’s material, financial, and military assets. In fact, there would be none. New Delhi displayed no intention of dividing the assets of British India with its major adversary, thereby establishing a balance between the two countries. Moreover, India’s superior geopolitical position and, most importantly, its control of the vital rivers that flowed into Pakistan meant that the Muslim country’s water supplies were at the mercy of its larger, hostile neighbour. Pakistan’s condition was so precarious following independence that many observers believed the country could hardly survive six months and that India’s goal of a unified subcontinent remained a distinct possibility. Nazimuddin assumed the premiership on Liaquat’s death, and Ghulam Muhammad took his place as the governor-general. Ghulam Muhammad, a Punjabi, had been Jinnah’s choice to serve as Pakistan’s first finance minister and was an old and successful civil servant. The juxtaposition of these two very different personalities—Nazimuddin, known for his piety and reserved nature, and Ghulam Muhammad, a staunch advocate of strong, efficient administration—was hardly fortuitous. Nazimuddin’s assumption of the office of prime minister meant the country would have a weak head of government, and, with Ghulam Muhammad as governor-general, a strong head of state. Pakistan’s viceregal tradition was again in play.

In 1953 riots erupted in the Punjab, supposedly over a demand by militant Muslim groups that the Aḥmadiyyah sect be declared non-Muslim and that all members of the sect holding public office be dismissed. (Special attention was directed at Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, an Aḥmadiyyah and Pakistan’s first foreign minister.) Nazimuddin was held responsible for the disorder, especially for his inability to quell it, and Ghulam Muhammad took the opportunity to dismiss the prime minister and his government. Although another Bengali, Muhammad Ali Bogra, replaced Nazimuddin, there was no ignoring the fact that the viceregal tradition was continuing to dominate Pakistani political life and that Ghulam Muhammad, a bureaucrat and never truly a politician, with others like him, controlled Pakistan’s destiny.

 

 

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